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No. CIV-3-71-48 
BRIEF OF TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
INJUNCTION 
STATEMENT 
1. Introduction 
Plaintiffs seek a preliminary and permanent 
injunction to halt construction of the Tellico project for 
alleged violation of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 
(87 Stat. 884, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq. (Supp. IV, 1974). 
The gist of the complaint is that in the summer of 1973 a 
small fish called the "snail darter" was found in that por-
tion of the Little Tennessee River which will be impounded 
by Tellico Darn; that the fish was listed as an endangered 
species under the Act; that the impoundment of the Tellico 
Reservoir will destroy the fish's only known habitat and 
result in its extinction; and that TVA's construction and 
timber clearing operations jeopardize the continued existence 
of the snail darter in violation of section 7 of the Endangered 
Species Act (16 U.S.C. § 1536). 
TVA has filed a motion to dismiss the action because 
of plaintiffs' failure to give the statutory notice required 
as a condition precedent to invoking the court's jurisdiction. 
This brief is in support of the motion to dismiss, and also 
in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion. 
It is TVA's position that: 
' 1. The action should be dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction; 
2. The Endangered Species Act does not apply to 
the Tellico project; 
3. The Endangered Species Act, if applicable, does 
not prevent completion of the Tellico project; 
4. Congressional action has made judicial review 
unnecessary and inappropriate; and 
5. Plaintiffs are not entitled to injunctive 
relief. 
2. Factual Background 
The Tellico project was authorized by Congress on 
October 15, 1966, as a multi-purpose water resource and 
2 
regional development project to develop navigation; control 
destructive floods; generate electric power; provide water 
supply and produce other benefits including recreation, fish 
and wildlife use, and shoreline development; create new job 
opportunities; promo~e industrial development; and foster 
improved economic conditions. Construction on the dam began 
March 7, 1967. By April 1975 construction was about 60 per-
cent complete; about 90 percent of the land had been acquired; 
about $60 million (of an estimated $100 million cost) had been 
invested in the project; and the dam scheduled for closure in 
January 1977 (Testimony of TVA Chairman Wagner, Hearings 
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 7, at 19, 437, 466 (1975)). Today 
approximately $80 million has been invested, and the project 
is nearly 80 percent completed. 
The environmental impacts of the Tellico project 
have been exhaustively examined. They were fully discussed 
(in TVA's Environmental Impact Statement, and have been liti-
1 gated twice before this Court (1971 and 1973) and twice before 
.I 
the court of appeals. The basic facts concerning the project 
.. are set out in the reported decisions of the two courts 
(Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 
339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 
1972); 371 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn. 1973), aff'd, 492 F.2d 
466 (6th Cir. 1974)). 
Although the snail darter was not mentioned by name 
in that litigation (it was discovered in August 1973), the 
3 
general subject of rare or endangered fish \vas an important 
issue. The court found in the 1971 trial that: 
The free-flowing river is the likely habitat 
of one or more of seven rare or endangered 
fish species [339 F. Supp. at 808]. 
TVA's final environmental statement, which was 
approved by the court in the 1973 trial,,contains a detailed 
discussion of rare or endangered fish, and lists eleven 
species of darters known to occur, or which may occur, in 
the portions of the Little Tennessee River to be impounded: 
greenside darter, redline darter, Tennessee snubnose darter, 
speckled darter, gilt darter, dusky darter, bluebreast 
darter, spotted darter, banded darter, dusttail darter, and 
tangerine darter (EIS II-12-2, -3). Among other things, the 
EIS contains extensive comments received from Dr. David Etnier, 
Assistant Professor at the University of Tennessee, which state 
/ 
/''that the_ Little Tennessee River System contains 11at least three 
I endangered species" and "an undescribed darter"; and also that (/ "new species continue to be discovered. in Tennessee at the 
rate of about one per year" (EIS I-3-63, -64). 
In the summer of 1973, Dr. Etnier announced he had 
discovered the snail darter, a small tan-colored fish about 
three inches long. The Endangered Species Act of 1973 became 
law December 28, 1973. The snail darter was placed on the 
endangered species list effective November 10, 1975. 
More than a year before the snail darter was placed 
on the list of endangered species, TVA began a program to 
4 
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perpetuate this darter. On September 13, 1974, TVA entered 
into a contract with the University of Tennessee to fund a 
study of the life history and habitat of the fish and to 
investigate the possibility of transplanting the species into 
other rivers. Thereafter, TVA commenced its own intensive 
program to scientifically study its life history, to trans-
plant it to a new habitat, and to search for new populations 
of snail darters in other areas. This program is underway 
today. These, and other conservation actions, have all been 
coordinated in consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service and the Office of Endangered Species. 
During the latest congressional appropriation 
hearings involving the Tellico project, held in April and 
. // v May 1975, TVA informed'both the House and the Senate commit-
tees of the discovery of the snail darter, what effect the 
Tellico Dam would have on it, and the efforts TVA was making , ~· 
to preserve the darter. TVA also explained to these commit-
tees that TVA was of the opinion that the enactment of the 
Endangered Species Act of 1973 and discovery of the darter 
did not warrant halting construction of the project and that 
the Act should not be so construed. Being thus advised, 
Congress appropriated over $29 million for the project. The 
appropriation bill was signed by the President on December 26, 
1975. In recommending these appropriations, the House 
Committee on Appropriations remarked: 
5 
The Committee directs that the project, for 
which an environmental impact statement has 
been completed and provided the Committee, 
should be completed as lromptly as possible 
for energy supply and f ood protection in 
the public interest [H.R. Rep. No1 94-319, 94th Gong., 1st Sess. 76 (1975)]. 
TVA is proceeding with completion of the project in 
accordance with the congressional mandate. 
ARGUMENT 
It is basic law that plaintiffs have the burden of 
establishing jurisdiction of the court; of proving that TVA 
has violated the Endangered Species Act; and of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that they have met the four 
prerequisites established for the issuance of a preliminary 
injunction. It is TVA 1 s position that plaintiffs cannot 
carry the burden as to any of these matters and that: (1) the 
action should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (2) the 
Act does not apply to this project; (3) the Act, if applicable, 
does not prevent completion of this project; (4) Congressional 
action in appropriating funds for the project with knowledge 
of the darter has made judicial review unnecessary and 
inappropriate; and (5) plaintiffs are not entitled to injunc-
tive relief. 
1 Emphasis added herein unless otherwise noted. 
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1. This Court Is Without Jurisdiction Since 
Plaintiffs Have Failed to Comply with 
the Jurisdictional Prerequisites of 
the Endangered Species Act. 
It is elementary that the jurisdiction of a federal 
district court is limited to that jurisdiction specifically 
granted to it by Congress. As stated by the Supreme Court 
in Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922) :-
Only the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is 
derived directly from the Constitution. Every 
other court created by the general government 
derives its jurisdiction wholly from the 
authority of Congress. That body may give, 
withhold or restrict such jurisdiction at its 
discretion, provided it be not extended beyond 
the boundaries fixed by the Constitution [at 
234]. . 
It is also well'established that the party invoking the 
district court's jurisdiction has the duty of affirmatively 
alleging jurisdiction and if his allegations are controverted, 
has the burden of establishing such jurisdiction. 1 J. Moor~, 
Federal Practice! 0.60[4], at 609 (2 ed. 1975); McNutt v. 
General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936). 
This Court's jurisdiction in this case, as alleged 
by plaintiffs, rests solely on the Endangered Species Act of 
1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(c) and 1540(g). That jurisdictional 
grant is conditional and certain procedural prerequisites 
must be met before such jurisdiction may· be invoked. 
Section ll(g), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g), provides that: 
No action may be commenced . prior to sixty 
days after written notice of the violation has 
7 
been given to the Secretary, and to any alleged 
violator . 
Where, as here, Congress has provided a statutory procedure 
to be followed as a condition precedent to invoking the 
jurisdiction of the federal court, that procedure must be 
strictly followed. Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans 
& Trust Co., 379 U.S. 411, 422 (1965); Lichter v. United 
States, 334 U.S. 742, 789-92 (1948). As the court stated in 
Munro v. United States, 303 U.S. 36 (1938): 
Suits against the United States can be maintained 
only by permission, in the manner prescribed and 
subject to the restrictions imposed [at 41]. 
In this case plaintiffs have failed to follow the 
prescribed statutory procedure in that they failed to give 
the requisite statutory notice. First, the complaint does 
not allege that notice of the violation was given to the 
Secretary of Interior as required by the Act. This alone 
defeats the court's jurisdiction. Second, the snail darter 
was not officially listed as an endangered species at the 
time the alleged notice to TVA was given. A "violation" 
could not occur until the snail darter was listed as endangered. 
Plaintiffs' notice was given on October 20, 1975, but the 
effective date of the listing of the snail darter did not 
take effect until November 10, 1975. It is obvious that t.he 
Act contemplates that there must first be a violation, 
followed by a written notice to the Secretary and the alleged 
violator of such violation, followed by a 60-day waiting 
8 
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period before any court action can be maintained. Since 
plaintiffs' alleged notice was given before there could con-
ceivably.be a violation, it could not constitute "notice of 
the violation" as required by the Act. 
Plaintiffs' failure to strictly comply with the 
statutory notice requirements deprives this Court of juris-
diction and requires dismissal of this action. Dismissal for 
this reason was granted in West Penn Power Co. v. Train, 378 
F. Supp. 941 (W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 522 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 
1975), where the petitioner did not give the required 60-day 
statutory notice under the Clean Air Act. The court stated: 
It appears from the complaint and the admissions 
of the parties that no such notice was given 
prior to the institution of this suit. We agree 
with the defendant that the Con ress can s ecif 
in legislation tems unon w ich t e government 
consents to be sued and such terms must be 
strictly followed. Hence, the court has no 
1urisdiction of this suit under that Section 
at 944]. 
See also Peabody Coal Co. v. Train, 518 F.2d 940, 943 (6th 
Cir. 1975); City of Highland Park v. Train, 374 F. Supp. 758 
(N.D. Ill. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 681, '691, petition for cert. 
filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3265 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1975) (No. 75-610); 
Pinkney v. Ohio Environmental Protection Agency, 375 F. Supp. 
305, 308-09 (N.D. Ohio, 1974). 
2. The Endangered Species Act Does Not 
Apply to the Tellico Project. 
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 became effective 
on December 28, 1973. This was more than seven years after 
9 
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(\;' ~,, the Tellico project was authorized and nearly seven years 
after construction began. The project was more than half 
completed when the Act became lmv, and Congress, by then, had 
appropriated $45,465,000 out of a then estimated cost of 
$69,000,000 for the project. TVA's Final Environmental 
Statement already had been approved by this court (371 F. Supp. 
1004) and that opinion was later affirmed by the court of 
appeals (492 F.2d 466). Today the project is nearly 80 per-
cent completed. 
Did Congress intend the Act to ·apply in these 
circumstances? We think it clear that it did not. 
The basic question is whether Congress intended 
this legislation to operate retroactively as to this project. 
There can be no doubt that there comes a time at some stage 
of a project when the federal action becomes so complete as 
to make the application of a subsequently enacted federal 
statute to that project retroactive in nature and contrary 
to congressional intent. The principl.e is well stated in 
Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323, 1331 
(4th Cir. 1972), involving the National Environmental Policy 
Act: 
Doubtless Congress did not intend that all 
projects ongoing at the effective date of 
the Act be subject to the requirements of 
Section 102. At some stage of progress, the 
!-costs of altering or abandoning the project could so definitely outweigh whatever bene-fits that might accrue therefrom that it might no ~()ngc:=r .be "p9ssible" to change the 
10 
project in accordance with Section 102. At 
some stage, federal action may be so "complete'' 
that applying the Act could be considered 
"retroactive" application not intended by the 
Congress. 
Whether the statute applies to a particular project 
will obviously depend upon the circumstances of the case; but 
as to Tellico, we submit that the project has reached such a 
stage of completion that the application of the Endangered 
Species Act would constitute an impermissible retroactive 
application not intended by Congress. The legislative history 
of the latest appropria~ion bill appropriating funds for this 
project clearly demonstrates that Congress, with full knowl-
edge of the snail darter and the Endangered Species Act, 
intended this project to go forward to completion. At those 
hearings TVA's Chairman of the Board, Mr. Wagner, testified 
in support of the President's recommended $23,742,000 budget 
for fiscal 1976 for this project. In the course of this 
testimony Congressman Evins, Chairman of the Subcommittee, 
asked him: 
Explain the environmental problem with a species 
of minnow that you are now experiencing in con-
nection with the Tellico project. How do you 
plan to resolve this problem [Hearings Before a 
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Aptropriations, 
94th Gong., 1st Sess., pt. 7, at 66 (1975)]. 
In his statement Mr. Wagner, after explaining the 
collection of the snail darter in August 1973, and the exten-
sive litigation involving the environmental consequences of 
the Tellico·project, said in part: 
11 
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There is no litigation presently pending 
concerning the Tellico project. It appeais, 
however, that opponents of the project may 
again be planning to litigate its completion 
on the ground that such completion would de-
stroy the habitat of the darter in question, 
which they say ·would violate the Endangered 
Species Act of 1973 if the fish is eventually 
listed as endangered. That act, Hhich became 
law in 1973, certainly requires us to do what 
we can to preserve endangered species. But 
it does not repeal prior congressional approval 
and funding of the Tellico project, or any 
other lawfully, congressionally authorized 
project, because the habitat or range of an 
endangered species will necessarily be de-
stroyed, altered, or curtailed by the comple-
tion of the project. To so construe the act 
would mean that the Secretary of the Interior 
would have absolute veto power over any con-
gressionally authorized and funded project, 
regardless of its stage of completion, if any 
opponent of the project could obtain additions 
to the endangered species list of any species 
of fis·h, wildlife, or plant ...;.;rhich could not 
be conserved except by stopping the project. 
If the act were so construed, the Secretary 
of the Interior could halt the Tellico project, 
the Duck River project, the Army Corps of 
Engineers' Tennessee-Tombigbee project and 
Gillham Dam project, or any other Government 
project. 
* * 
In summary, we believe the environmental 
consequences of the Tellico project have 
been fully and adequately disclosed; that 
while we will do our best to reserve the 
darter if it in act proves to e a istinct 
species and is listed as endangered, the 
project should be completed in any event; 
and that the President's full appropriation 
request for fiscal year 1976 should be 
approved [Id. at 467]. 
This exact statement was made before both the 
House and Senate committees. 
12 
In recommending the full amount requested for 
Tellico, the committee stressed the "enormous contribution 
to America" that has been made by projects for water supply, 
power development, flood control, navigation, reclamation, 
and recreation saying that they represent "a substantial 
investment in the future of our Nation, an investment that 
will pay rich dividends in services and economic benefits 
for the American people" (H.R. Rep. No. 94-319, 94th Gong., 
1st Sess. 3, 4 (1975)). It also pointed out the lasting 
value of such projects: 
The committee believes that the jo~s created 
by the construction funds in this ill are 
more beneficial to the American people than 
those jobs created by temporary public service 
programs. The results of the productive jobs 
created by this bill--electric power on line, 
flood control facilities constructed; improved 
harbors and navigation, expanded irrigation--
will benefit the American people for decades 
to come. 
* * * 
Through the years the Committee has strongly 
supported the Tennessee Valley Authority. 
The committee reflects with great pride on 
its consistent and constant support of the 
vital and important programs of this agency 
which have, among other accomplishments and 
achievements, prevented much flood damage, 
promoted navigation, produced electric power, 
created reforestation, encouraged industrial· , 
development and enerall im roved economic 
conditions of the Tennessee Va ey area I . 
at 5, 75-76]. 
These are some of the considerations which led the 
committee to conclude, despite its knowledge that the project 
13 
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would destroy, alter, or curtail the habitat of the snail 
darter, that the project should be completed: 
The bill provides the budget request of 
$23,742,000 fo~ construction of the Tellico 
darn reservoir. The Committee directs that 
the project, for which an environmental 
impact statement has been completed and pro-
vided the Committee, should be completed as 
¥romptly as possible for energy supply and 
lood protection in the public interest 
[Id. at 76]. -
It is clear from the law, and from this legislative 
history, that Congress has considered the benefits of this 
project in the form of navigation, flood control, electric 
power, jobs, new industrial development, recreation, shore-
line development, etc., in which nearly $80 million have 
already been invested; has weighed them against the benefits 
of the snail darter; and has determined that the Endangered 
Species Act was not intended to apply to this project. 
3. The Endanfered Species Act, If 
Applicab e, Does Not Prevent 
Completion of the Tellico 
Project. 
Even if applicable to Tellico, the Act should not 
be interpreted as a straight-jacket which can be imposed to 
halt its construction. Rather, the Act should be construed 
2 The appropriation bill as finally passed included slightly 
over $29 million for Tellico to carry through September 30, 
1976. The $23,742,000 figure represents the amount appropriated 
through June 30, 1976. 
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in a reasonable manner so as to carry out the expressed intent 
of Congress. This is a basic principle of statutory construc-
tion. In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of 
Engineers, 342 F. Supp. 1211, 1217 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 470 
F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973), 
the court applied this rule of reason to the National Environ-
mental Policy Act, saying: 
Congress, we must assume, intended and expected 
the courts to interpret the NEPA in a reason-
able manner in order to effectuate its obvious 
purposes and objectives. 
Section 7 (16 U.S.C. § 1536) of the Endangered 
Species Act reads as follows: 
§ 1536. Interagency cooperation. 
The Secretary shall review other programs 
administered by him and utilize such programs 
in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter. 
All other Federal departments and agencies 
shall, in consultation with and with the assis-
tance of the Secretary, utilize their authori-
ties in furtherance of the purposes of this 
chapter by carrying out programs for the_ 
conservation of endangered species and . 
threatened species listed pursuant to section 
1533 of this title and by ta~ing such action 
necessary to insure that actions authorized, 
funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize 
the continued existence of such endangered 
species and threatened species or result in the 
destruction or modification of habitat of such 
species which is determined by the Secretary. 
after consultation as appropriate with. the 
affected States, to be critical. 
If applicable, this section directs TVA to "consult" with 
the Secretary of the Interior and secure his "assistance" 
in taking action in furtherance of the "purposes" of the 
Act. But this section and its legislative history also make 
15 
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it clear that Congress intended to commit to TVA the authority 
and responsibility for deciding whether the project should go 
forward after the consultation process has taken place. The 
following colloquy between Senator Tunney, floor manager of 
the bill in the Senate, in explaining the meaning of this 
section to Senator Cook of Kentucky, leaves no doubt that 
such was the intent of Congress: 
MR. COOK. . . The point I have in mind is 
that we have the Pioneer Weapons Hunting Area 
in the State of Kentucky. It is the only one 
of its kind in the United States. There is 
no other. It is a tremendous nesting area for 
wild turkeys. 
I might suggest that the Corps of Engineers 
decided that it would build a road right through 
the middle of this area. We have tried our best 
to have them change the route of the road. They 
had alternate routes, but they decided, despite 
their alternative routes, that this is where 
they would build the road. 
This language means that they have to consult 
'l;vith the respective agencies under this bill, 
and they have to consult with the respective 
State agencies in order to work out this 
problem. This is exactly what it means. And 
I would be less than candid if I did not explain 
that to the Senator. 
MR. TUNNEY. Mr. President, as I understand 
it, after the consultation process took place, 
the Bureau of Public Roads, or the Corps of 
Engineers, would not be prohibited from 
building such a road if they deemed it neces-
sary to do so. 
MR. COOK. The point is that they would then 
be doing it after consultation with the 
respective agencies, rather than making that 
decision on their own. 
MR. TUNNEY. But thet would have the final 
decision after consu tation. 
16 
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MR. COOK. The Senator has put me in a rather 
bad light. Under the terms of this, it would 
have to be under an agreement worked out with 
the respective agencies. 
MR. TUNNEY. Mr. President, as I understand 
the legislation, just reading the language: 
All other departments, agencies, and 
instrumentalities of the Federal Govern-
ment shall, in consultation and with the 
assistance of the Secretary--
(b) take such action as is necessary to 
insure that actions authorized, funded, 
or carried out by them do not jeopardize 
the continued existence of any endangered 
or threatened species, or result in the 
destruction or modification of any habitat 
of such species which is determined by the 
Secretary, after consultation to the extent 
appropriate and necessary with affected 
States, to be a critical habitat of such 
species. 
So, as I read the language, there has to be 
consultation. However, the Bureau of Public 
Roads or any other agency would have the 
final decision as to whether such a road 
should be built. That is my inter~retatio~ 
of the legislation at any rate [11 Gong. Rec. 
S. 14536 (daily ed., July 24, 1973)]. 
In short, the primary thrust of section 7 is that 
TVA must undertake meaningful "consultation" with Interior 
before taking any action which may affect the darter; but, 
once having done that, the final responsibility for decision-
making rests with TVA. 
TVA decided to proceed with the project but would 
do~he best it could to preserve the darter, even though the ~:sent habitat would necessarily be altered or destroyed. 
In supporting the President's request for appro-
priations to continue construction of this project, TVA 
17 
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informed Congress (both House and Senate) of the problem and 
explained to both that ''the habitat or range of an endangered 
species will necessarily be destroyed, altered, or curtailed 
by the completion of the project." TVA also told Congress 
.that the Act should not be construed to allow the project to 
be halted and that 
. while we \vill do our best to preserve 
the darter if it in fact proves to be a 
distinct species and is listed as endangered, 
the project should be completed in any event 
. . . [Hearings Before a Subcomrn. of the House 
Comm. on Atpropriations, 94th Gong., 1st Sess. 
pt. 7, at 67]. 
TVA further told the Senate Subcommittee that 
. certain groups are unwilling to still 
admit that project is going ahead, and there 
is a movement that has been started where 
someone has found a 3-inch minnow that they 
call a snail. dart. They are making efforts 
to have this included in the endangered 
species list by the Secretary of the Interior, 
and some actions have been taken there to 
again try to interfere with this project. 
This is the kind of thing that also can 
happen on the Duck River with some snails 
and mussels that are considered to be possibly 
on the endangered species list. We do not 
acknowledge that they are--that is the only 
place you find them. We think the claims are 
not justified, but Hhile this goes on, and 
while that project has been delayed, the cost 
\ of it has gone up by $31 million to $100 million. 
11And we have been losing 200 million kilowatts 
~of electricity a year that could be generated 
there. And we feel that this is a use of this 
Endangered Species Act now that was not intended 
by the Congress, and that can play havoc with 
any number of projects that might come up in 
the future--not only ours, but others. We hope 
that we can get that worked out satisfactorily. 
We would like to place a statement about this 
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in the record [Senate Hearings Before the Comrn. 
on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, 
at 3775]. 
Being thus advised, Congress appropriated the 
requested funds, and the appropriation bill was signed by 
the President on December 26, 1975. In approving TVA's 
budget request, the House subcommittee "directed" that the 
project "be completed as promptly as possible .. in the 
public interest" (H.R. Rep. No. 94-319, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 
76 (1975)). 
It is clear from this legislative history of both 
the Endangered Species Act and the appropriation bill, that 
Congress has agreed with TVA's interpretation that due to the 
advanced stage of this project, the Endangered Species Act 
does not require that the project be halted, but simply that 
TVA should do the best it can to preserve the darter while at 
the same time completing the project as promptly as possible. 
We think this interpretation is in keeping with both the 
letter and spirit of the Act as applie~ to a project in an 
advanced stage of construction at.the time the Act was papsed. 
As stated previously, the Act should be given a reasonable 
construction. Th.e Act should be read and construed as a 
whole, in the light of the purposes for which it was enacted. 
As said by the Supreme Court in the leading case of Richards 
v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962): 
We believe it fundamental that a section of a 
statute should not be read in isolation from 
the context of the whole Act, and that in ful-
filling our responsibility in interpreting 
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legislation, "we must not be guided by a single 
sentence or member of a sentence, but [should] 
look to the provisions of the whole law, and to 
its object and policy" [at 11]. 
Section 7 of the Act requires federal agencies to 
"utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes" 
of the Act. Those purposes are stated in section 1531 
entitled "Congressional findings and declaration of purposes 
and policy." This section notes that various plants and 
animals have been rendered extinct as a result of "economic 
growth and development untempered by adequate concern and 
conservation." Those four words "untempered by adequate 
concern" are the very evil at Hhich the Act is directed. 
That same section points out that the United States has 
pledged itself "to conserve to the extent practicable" these 
various species of plants and animals. It further states 
that the purposes of the Act are to provide a means whereby 
the ecosystems upon which these "species depend may be 
conserved." And finally it states that the federal agencies 
"shall seek to conserve" endangered species and threatened 
species and shall utilize their authorities in furtherance 
of the purposes of this chapter." "Seek" means "to make an 
attempt: Try" (Webster's Third New Internat'l Dictionary 
Unabridged (1961)). 
These stated policies and objectives are the 
guides by which all sections of the Act are to be construed 
in carrying out the congressional intent. The Act must be 
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read as a whole. No section can be read in isolation. Nor 
can the Act be read as though it operated in a vacuum. It 
was obviously not intended to supplant an agency's primary 
responsibilities, nor to abolish all other congressionally 
authorized projects or programs. Neither should it be con-
strued as a mandate to halt a congressionally authorized 
project without regard to its stage of completion. - This 
would reduce it to an absurdity. Congress certainly did not 
c~ntemplate the abandonment of large ongoing projects near 
completion for which it is currently appropriating funds--
and the Act should not be so construed. A statute is never 
literally construed so as to produce an "absurd" or "unreason-
able" result. United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 
U.S. 534, 543 (1940); .International T & T Corp. v. General 
T & E Corp.'· 518 F.2d 913, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1975). 
Moreover, it is clear that not every violation of 
the Act would warrant the issuance of an injunction. The 
"injunctive relief" authorized by the Act obviously means 
injunctive relief in the traditional sense as requiring the 
exercise of judicial discretion and restraint. Such relief 
is not granted automatically. As said by the Supreme Court 
in Truly v. Wanzer, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 140, 141 (1847): 
(J • 
There is no power, the exercise of which is 
more delicate, which requires greater caution, 
deliberation, and sound discretion, or more 
dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuing 
an injunction. It is the strong arm of equity, 
that never ought to be extended, unless to cases 
of great injury . . . . 
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See also,Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v, Detroit 
Typographical Union.No. 18, 471 F.2d 872, 876 (6th Cir. 1972). 
As pointed out in Reliable Transfer Co. v. Blanchard, 
145 F.2d 551, 552 (5th Cir. 1944), an injunction is an extra-
ordinary remedy, and it is hornbook law "that whether an 
injunction will or will not issue rests within the sound 
discretion of the court." 
All of these considerations support TVA's inter-
pretation of the Act as acquiesced in by the Congress. 
Chairman Wagner assured Congress that TVA \vould utilize its 
authority in furtherance of the purposes of the Act when he 
told both houses that "we will do our best to preserve the 
darter," but we'believe "the project should be completed in 
any event." · 
4. Congressional Action Has Made Judicial 
Review Unnecessary and Inapplopriate. 
In the circumstances of this case it would appear 
that congressional appropriations have·made judicial review 
unnecessary. Here we have a situation in "~;vhich the project 
is nearly 80 percent complete. A detailed environmental 
statement describing the environmental impacts of the 
project has been prepared and submitted to Congress. The 
environmental statement has been approved after extensive 
litigation by the district court and the court of appeals. 
Congress has been informed about the darter and what effect 
22 
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the project will have on it. Knowing all this, Congress 
has appropriated funds to continue its construction. 
The effect of congressional appropriations under 
such conditions was considered in Environmental Defense 
Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 
1974), involving the Tennessee-Tombigbee project. At the 
trial of the case, plaintiffs challenged_ the adequacy of the 
Corps' environmental statement. One of the grounds for 
challenge was the method used to calculate the economic 
benefits and cvsts. The district court refused to review 
the method of calculation on the ground that it was a legis-
lative matter not subject to judicial review. On appeal, the 
district court's opinion was affirmed. In doing so, the court 
of appeals held that it was not necessary for it to pass on 
the district court's decision as to the economic analysis 
because Congress, in appropriating funds with the Corps' 
environmental statement before it, has "displaced the necessity 
and propriety" of judicial review. The court said that 
Congress was fully informed about the environmental effects 
of the project, since they were discussed in the environ-
mental impact statement, and therefore when it appropriated 
funds for the project, Congress became the decisionmaker: 
With the Corps' Tennessee-Tombigbee impact 
statement before it, the details of detri-
ments and benefits of the project were 
extensively discussed,- the three-part method 
used by the Corps to comply with the Act was 
thoroughly aired, and Congress determined 
23 
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that the waterway should be built. Congress 
thus became the ultimate decisionmaker 
[emphasis in original] .... 
. . . the impact statement met the require-
ments of the Act. It gave Congress the 
factual background and information contem-
plated bt NEPA so that Congress could make 
the fina decision that construction of the 
Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway should proceed. 
This informed and deliberate legislative 
action, while not barring court review for 
procedural compliance, nevertheless effec~ 
tively supplants the Corps' recommendation 
that the. project be built. Hence, even 
severely circumscribed judicial review is 
both ina~posite and unnecessary [492 F.ZO 
at 1140- 1]. 
The situation in the case at bar is almost an 
exact parallel; and we respectfully submit that Congress, as 
the ultimate de~isionmaker, has determined that construction 
of Tellico should proceed. 
5. Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled to 
Injunctive Relief. 
The prerequisites for granting a preliminary 
injunction are well known and aptly st~ted in the recent 
case of Canal Authority of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 
567, 572-73 (5th Cir. 1974): 
The grant or denial of a preliminary injunction 
rests in the discretion of the district court. 
Johnson v. Radford, 5 Cir. 1971, 449 F.2d 115. 
The district court does not exercise unbridled 
discretion, however. It must exercise that 
discretion in light of what we have termed 
"the four prerequisites for the extraordinary 
relief of preliminary injunction." Allison v. 
Froehlke, 5 Cir. 1972, 470 F.2d 1123, 1126. 
The four prerequisites are as follows: (1) a 
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substantial likelihood that plaintiff will 
prevail on the merits, (2) a substantial 
threat that plaintiff will suffer irreparable 
injury if the injunction is not granted, 
(3) that the threatened injury to plaintiff 
outweighs the threatened harm the injunction 
may do to defendant, and (4) that granting 
the preliminary injunction \vill not dis serve 
the public interest. Di Giorgio v. Causey, 
5 Cir. 1973, 488 F.2d 527; Blackshear Residents 
Organization v. Romney, 5 Cir. 1973, 472 F.2d 
1197. 
The court emphasized that the plaintiff carries 
the burden of proof on all of these issues: 
The burden of persuasion on all of the four 
requirements for a preliminary injunction is 
at all times upon the plaintiff. 
First,and foremost, we reemphasize the 
importance of the general requirements for 
a preliminary injunction. It is an extra-
ordinary remedy, not available unless the 
plaintiff carries his burden of persuasion 
as to all of the four prerequisites. The 
primary justification for granting a pre-
liminary injunction is to preserve the 
court's ability to render a meaningful 
decision after a trial on the merits [Id. 
at 573, 576]. -
These same principles are recognized by the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals. North Avondale Neighborhood Ass'n v. 
Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority, 464 F.2d 486, 
488 (6th Cir. 1972). 
The above principles are \vell established and 
clearly demonstrate that plaintiffs are not entitled to 
such relief. 
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1. There is certainly no "substantial likelihood" 
that plaintiffs will prevail on the merits. The Endangered 
Species Act became effective December 28, 1973--more than 
seven years after Tellico was authorized, and more than 
6-1/2 years after construction began. The snail darter was 
officially put on the endangered species list November 10, 
1975--more than nine years after Tellico was authorized. 
The extent to which that Act applies to the Tellico project 
in its present state of completion would alone raise ques-
tions of sufficient uncertainty to defeat plaintiffs' claim 
of substantial likelihood of success. Moreover the action 
of Congress in appropriating over $29 million for construe~ 
tion of this project through September 30, 1976, after being 
fully informed of the .snail darter, and after the House 
appropriation committee said it "directs that the project 
. should be completed as promptly as possible," removes 
all likelihood of plaintiffs' success on the merits. 
2. Neither is there any substantial threat that 
plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury if an injunction 
is not issued. There is no present threat to the darter. 
To the contrary, the proof is that there is less silt going 
into the river from the project area today than there was 
before the project was authorized in 1966. The dam will not 
be closed until January 1977; and there is a good likelihood 
that by the time of closure, the darter may be safely trans-
planted to other habitats or that new populations of darters 
may be found else1;vhere. 
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3. On the issue as to whether the threatened 
injury to plaintiffs would outweigh the harm an injunction 
would do to TVA, it is clear that plaintiff cannot prevail. 
The proof shows that halting of this project in this period 
of spiraling costs would cause the laying off of many workers, 
the expense of storing and protecting large quantities of 
equipment and machinery against rust and weathering, the 
loss of time and money in shutting dmm and starting up, 
and the loss of thousands of dollars due to escalating 
construction costs while the project stands idle. No harm 
would be caused to plaintiffs if an injunction were not 
issued. 
4. Finally it is clear that the issuance of a 
preliminary injunction would not be in the interest of the 
general public. As stated above, the House Committee on 
·Appropriations directed that this project be completed as 
promptly as possible "in the public interest." The Congress 
has already committed nearly $80 million to this project so 
that the public may realize the enormous benefits that will 
be derived in the form of navigation, flood control, electric 
power, recreation, jobs, new industrial growth, etc. These 
benefits should be realized without further delay. Horeover, 
since TVA is an agency of the government and is constructing 
this project for the public with public funds, any increase 
in the cost of construction necessarily involves the public 
interest. Congress speaks for the public, and it has spoken. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully 
submitted that the action should be dismissed or, if not 
dismissed, that plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction 
be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Herbert S. Sanger, Jr. 
General Counsel 
Tennessee Valley Authority 
Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 
Charles A. Wagner III 
Assistant General Counsel 
Thomas A. Pedersen 
Lawrence E. Shearer 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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HOTION TO DISMISS 
Defendant Tennessee Valley Authority moves the Court to 
dismiss this action on the ground that the Court lacks jurisdic-
tion because plaintiffs have failed to comply with the statutory 
notice requirements for invoking the jurisdiction of this Court 
under the Endangered Species Act of 1973. 
Respectfully submi·tted, 
Heioert s. Sanger, Jr. 
'General Counsel 
Tennessee Valley Authority 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that the foregoing motion, together with brief 
in support of motion to dismiss and in opposition to motion for 
injunction, has been served on plaintiffs by hand·deliveriug a 
copy thereof to the offices of tv. P. Boone Dougherty, Esq. , 
Bernstein, Dougherty & Susano, 1200 l~lton National Bank 
Building, Knoxville, Tennessee 37902. 
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